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Research suggests that distorted images of the self are common in social phobia and play a role in
maintaining the disorder. The images are often linked in thematic and sensory detail to distressing
memories that are clustered around the onset or worsening of the disorder. This has led to
speculation about the likely beneﬁt of working directly with these memories to improve symptoms of
social phobia. In this exploratory study, we describe a process of cognitive restructuring followed by
imagery rescripting to update the meanings of distressing memories and images in social phobia. We
ﬁrst present illustrative clinical examples and then data of 14 patients with social phobia, on whom
we developed this approach. Patients attended an imagery rescripting session in which a semi-
structured interview was used to identify their recurrent images, the associated memories and their
meanings. Next the identiﬁed memory was evoked and elaborated. We updated the meaning of the
memory by ﬁrst using cognitive restructuring to arrive at new perspectives and then linking these
perspectives with the memory using imagery techniques. The procedure resulted in signiﬁcant within
session change in beliefs, and in image and memory distress and vividness. One week later signiﬁcant
change was seen in social phobia cognitions and a self-report measure of social anxiety. Rescripting
distressing memories in social phobia appears to be an effective way of modifying maladaptive beliefs
linked to recurrent negative imagery. This paper presents our exploratory investigation of how to
work with the memories and encourages more rigorous investigation in this area.
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At the heart of cognitive models of anxiety lies the idea that distorted appraisals lead to
perceived threat and anxiety. These appraisals are typically described as verbal thoughts.
To access highly charged appraisals, Beck (1976) stressed the importance of considering
images and memories as well as verbal thoughts. In their manual on cognitive therapy for
anxiety disorders, Beck, Emery, and Greenberg (1985) also note that in addition to affect
and increased estimates of danger, imagery spontaneously emerges when approaching or
entering a feared situation, further highlighting its relevance to anxiety. These observations
are consistent with recent research on social phobia.
The text revision of the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) describes social
phobia as a persistent fear of certain social or performance situations, in which the person
fears that they will act in a way (or show anxiety symptoms) that will be embarrassing or
humiliating. A key suggestion in the Clark and Wells (1995) cognitive model of social
phobia is that when feeling threatened in social situations, patients switch to processing the
self as a social object, their attention turning to internal rather than external stimuli.
Consistent with this view, a number of studies have found when patients with social phobia
enter social situations, or recall such situations, they experience visual and/or somatic
images of themselves as an object of the scrutiny of others. They report seeing themselves
as if from an observer’s perspective and appearing the way they imagine they come across
to other people (Coles, Turk, & Heimberg, 2002; Coles, Turk, Heimberg, & Fresco, 2001;
Hackmann, Surawy, and Clark, 1998; Wells, Clark, & Ahmad, 1998). They report
appraising this mental representation as mirroring a true reﬂection of the self, yet the
image or impression is typically distorted in a negative way. Many studies (Alden &
Wallace, 1995; Mulkens, de Jong, Dobbelaar, & Bogels, 1999; Rapee & Abbott, 2006;
Rapee & Lim, 1992; Stopa & Clark, 1993) have shown that patients hold excessively
negative self-perceptions: relative to observers, they underestimate their social perfor-
mance, overestimate how visible their anxiety symptoms appear and underestimate their
general attractiveness.
Rapee and Heimberg (1997) also suggest that on entering a social situation a socially
phobic person forms a mental representation of their appearance and behaviour (as
presumably seen by an audience) and simultaneously focuses attention onto both this
internal representation and on any perceived threat in the environment. The mental
representation is considered to be a loose amalgam based on a variety of inputs, including
material from long term memory.
The Clark and Wells (1995) and Rapee and Heimberg (1997) models of social phobia
incorporate patients’ attention to negative self-images. It is difﬁcult to establish the exact
sequence of appraisals, imagery and attentional deployment in anxiety-provoking
situations as events unfold so quickly in response to perceived danger. However, research
suggests that negative self-images may have a causal role in social anxiety. Hirsch, Clark,
Mathews, and Williams (2003) asked patients with social phobia to hold a negative or
neutral image in mind whilst having a conversation with a stranger. The conversation was
videotaped and an independent assessor watched the video to rate patients’ performance.
Patients felt more anxious and believed they came across more poorly when they held the
negative image in mind compared to when they held the neutral image in mind. Further,
the independent assessor’s ratings of patients’ performance were lower in the negative
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are high in social anxiety (e.g., Hirsch, Meynen, & Clark, 2004; Vassilopoulos, 2005) and in
participants who are low in public speaking anxiety (Hirsch, Mathews, Clark, Williams, &
Morrison, 2006). Overall, the results suggest that deliberately holding a negative image in
mind (rather than a positive or more neutral image) makes participants feel more anxious,
engage in more safety behaviours, believe they come across more poorly and receive poorer
performance ratings by an observer.
Future studies could more closely examine whether it is only negative self-images that
have these effects, or whether any anxiety provoking control image might be equally
detrimental. However, the results so far suggest that negative self-images are prevalent,
and play a role in maintaining social phobia. They trigger anxiety and safety behaviours,
both of which can play their part in perpetuating underlying negative appraisals of social
situations.
There is also some evidence that the negative self-images reported in social phobia may
have input from autobiographical memory. Hackmann, Clark, and McManus (2000)
carried out a study of images and their possible links to memories in this disorder. All
participants reported negative, spontaneous self-imagery that was recurrent. That is, the
images were relatively stable across time and in feared social situations. In addition, most
recurrent images were linked to memories of adverse social events, clustered in time around
the onset or worsening of the disorder. These events typically involved bullying, criticism
or humiliation. The links between patients’ current imagery and earlier events were
established by evoking the recurrent image, exploring its content and meaning, then
enquiring when in their life the patient could remember having had a similar experience.
The study suggested that the intrusive images that are characteristic of social phobia may
have substantial input from events in memory, since the reported images and memories
were often strikingly similar in content and meaning. Further, patients frequently
described the memories as representing points at which their social phobia started or
worsened. Conway, Meares, and Standart (2004) suggest that memories of negative, self
deﬁning moments can be aversive, leading to avoidance, with little opportunity for these
memories to ﬁnd a place in autobiographical memory. This makes them more likely to be
triggered automatically with the potential to disrupt functioning. They may then be
described as intrusions that are ‘‘out of context, out of proportion, or simply out of time’’
(Rachman, 1980).
Since such imagery appears to contain input from memory of upsetting experiences, we
have previously speculated on the potential value of working directly with such memories
in cognitive therapy for anxiety disorders (Hackmann, 2005). Intrusive imagery with input
from memory of a traumatic event is an important focus in cognitive therapy for
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), for example. In the Ehlers and Clark (2000)
approach to PTSD, attention is paid to deliberately access the meanings of the worst
moments of the trauma through the process of reliving, and then updating these meanings
with information that provides more realistic (e.g., ‘‘I did not die’’) and less toxic (e.g., ‘‘It
was not my fault’’) appraisals of the trauma. This is accomplished using verbal and
imagery techniques (Ehlers, Clark, Hackmann, McManus, & Fennell, 2005). During
cognitive therapy for PTSD that involves these elements, the intrusive imagery decreases in
frequency, distress and vividness (Ehlers, Hackmann, &Michael, 2004; Hackmann, Ehlers,
Speckens, & Clark, 2004) and idiosyncratic belief ratings change. These results, and other
observations across disorders, lead to the idea that where there is recurrent, intrusive
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to work directly on disturbing memories using similar techniques to those used in the
treatment of PTSD.
These suggestions are not entirely novel. Throughout the history of cognitive
behavioural therapy (CBT), value has been placed on the element of imaginal exposure,
giving attention to images which appear to reﬂect input from memory. We see this, for
example, in systematic desensitisation (Weitzman, 1967), imaginal ﬂooding (Levis, 1980)
and repeated reliving or imaginal exposure (Foa & Rothbaum, 1998). In addition,
procedures for addressing and transforming the content or meaning of upsetting memories
have been described by many (e.g., Arntz & Weertman, 1999; Beck et al., 1985; Beck, 1995;
Edwards, 1990; Giesen-Bloo et al., 2006; Hackmann, 1998, 2005; Layden, Newman,
Freeman, & Morse, 1993; Young, Klosko, & Weishhaar, 2003).
However, there is a relatively limited amount of information concerning the outcome of
this set of therapeutic procedures studied in isolation from other treatment components.
Smucker and Neiderdee (1995) report on the therapeutic effect of imagery rescripting in
PTSD arising from childhood sexual abuse. A study by Hunt et al. (2006) on participants
fearful of snakes found that treatment condition (cognitive imagery modiﬁcation, in-vivo
exposure, or minimal exposure plus relaxation) interacted with initial severity. Speciﬁcally,
highly fearful participants responded better to cognitive imagery modiﬁcation than to in-
vivo exposure, and they found the intervention less aversive. Both the active treatment
groups improved signiﬁcantly more than the group provided with a minimal exposure,
relaxation control procedure. Also, delivered in a single session, imagery rescripting has
produced signiﬁcantly greater change than verbal discussion in bulimia nervosa (Cooper,
Todd, & Turner, in press, 2007; Ohanian, 2001). Grunert, Smucker, Weis, and Rusch
(2003) have reported ﬁnding imagery rescripting an effective extra component in the
treatment of PTSD in cases where imaginal exposure alone has not proved effective.
This Special Issue is timely as it brings together recent attempts to gather more
information about the effectiveness of this type of intervention. Wheatley, Brewin, Patel,
and Hackmann (this issue) describe two cases of patients with depression and intrusive
memories where they obtained good results from sessions devoted exclusively to rescripting
disturbing memories, and the beneﬁts were maintained at 6 month follow-up. Arntz,
Tiesema, and Kindt (this issue) present a comparison of imaginal exposure with and
without imagery rescripting in the treatment of PTSD to begin the process of examining
the efﬁcacy of various elements in the treatment of disturbing memories.
Other recent studies also point to the usefulness of imagery rescripting. Weertman and
Arntz (in press) report the results of a comparison of imagery rescripting of disturbing
memories with more standard schema change techniques in personality disorder. They
found that both types of intervention led to signiﬁcant change. For patients and therapists,
the preferred order involved working with the memories, then moving to more present-
focused work. In another study of social phobia, Wild, Hackmann, and Clark (in press)
compared a single session of imagery rescripting to a control session in which the memories
were only discussed. The imagery rescripting session led to signiﬁcantly greater reductions
in social anxiety than the control session.
When we carried out the study reported here, there had been no previous studies on the
effects of rescripting distressing memories on cognitions and behaviours speciﬁc to social
phobia. However, we had used imagery rescripting with a subset of individuals in a recent
randomised controlled trial of cognitive therapy for social phobia (Clark et al., 2006) and
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(when delivered in a single session) on social phobia cognitions and behaviours. This paper
allows us the opportunity to describe our procedure in detail, and present case material to
illustrate the technique and its impact. Our procedure is unusual in that it involves an
element of verbally challenging old appraisals and considering new ones, before
consolidating the new perspectives in imagery. In this way it is similar to the Ehlers
et al. (2005) approach to PTSD, which interweaves verbal and imagery techniques.
Encouraged by the speed and magnitude of the changes in this small, exploratory study we
have subsequently put our version of rescripting to a more rigorous test by comparing it to
a control session of simply exploring the memories (Wild et al., in press). This has led to
promising results with the imagery rescripting session demonstrating signiﬁcantly greater
improvement in social anxiety than the control session.
2. Description of the intervention
2.1. Imagery interview
A semi-structured interview (Hackmann et al., 2000) was administered immediately
prior to the memory rescripting procedure. In the interview, an example of the
participant’s recurrent image in social situations was identiﬁed and described in the ﬁrst
person, present tense. The meaning of the image was elicited in relation to beliefs about the
self, others and the world. The interview then identiﬁed a distressing memory linked to the
recurrent image. To do this, participants were asked when they ﬁrst remembered an
experience that felt similar to that in their image. If several memories were elicited, the
most distressing memory with the most similar meaning to the recurrent image was
selected. Next the memory was brought to mind and its meaning elicited. The meanings of
both the image and memory were usually very similar and participants were asked to
summarise in their own words the ‘encapsulated belief’, a statement that captured both
meanings.
The imagery rescripting session followed the imagery interview. It involved two
components: cognitive restructuring to verbally challenge the old beliefs; and rescripting
the memory to include new perspectives, help contextualise the upsetting experience, and
update the patient’s understanding of it. They were given a short rationale:In the memory, it felt like (for example) people were always going to laugh at you. In
your image, you have a feeling that (for example) people are about to laugh at you.
The feeling is the same as in the memory. It sounds like you’re responding to people
as if they are (for example) your classmates. It is possible that the memory was
something that happened to you when you were younger, that does not apply to you
as an adult or with other people. It is possible that what happened in the memory is
not happening now, but it is like you are being haunted by the memory. You may be
processing the present as though it is the same circumstance as the past memory.
We need to get rid of the ghost. To do this, we’ll have a look at what your image and
memory mean, then go back and look at the memory in more detail.Patients then had a period of cognitive restructuring lasting up to 30min to help them
challenge the ‘encapsulated belief.’ Having generated the evidence for and against the
patient’s beliefs the therapist summarised this on the whiteboard.
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rescripting, which lasted approximately 45min. Patients revisited their memory in three
stages. In the ﬁrst step, the patient imagined they were the age at which the event occurred,
and relived it as if it happening again. Then they relived the memory at their current age,
watching what happened to their younger self. They could imagine intervening at this stage
if they wished. This often involved confronting critical others, and/or conveying to the
younger self the alternative perspective they had come up with in the cognitive
restructuring phase. Finally, they usually relived the memory again from the perspective
of their younger self with their adult self in the room with them, intervening as before. This
time the younger self was asked what else they might need to happen to feel better, and
then to imagine this happening. The younger self often requested extra nurturing and
compassion at this point.
3. Two case examples1
John had been a shy boy, but did well at school, and had two good friends. In his late
teenage years he and his friends experimented with drugs. When he was 20 John wanted to
stop taking drugs, but his friends put a lot of pressure on him to carry on, and began to
bully and criticise him. They spread gossip about him, and made his life a misery. In his
recurrent image John pictured himself looking acutely self-conscious, with a red face and
very big ears. He also experienced himself as alone without any back-up. The associated
memory was of arriving at a house where one of these friends was having a party, to which
he had invited lots of people John did not know. When he arrived at the door his friend
shouted out: ‘‘If that’s the weird guy with the big ears tell him he is not welcome here.’’ At
that point John felt humiliated, and believed he was ugly, unlikable and immature, beliefs
that were also activated in social situations in the present.
During the verbal discussion phase, the therapist encouraged John to come up with
alternative ways of seeing the situation. This included thinking of reasons why teenagers
sometimes tease and try to humiliate their friends, and what this says about the teenagers
who humiliated him, rather than himself. He was encouraged to think of what else he knew
now about his ‘‘friends,’’ and to consider examples before and after this event, in which he
was not humiliated or rejected by other people. In essence, the therapist helped John to
distinguish between what happened and what he thought when he was young, and what he
now knew about the situation. This was to help him to see the disturbing event as a time-
limited experience without implications for his present or future and to generate an adult
perspective that would be incorporated with the memory in the rescripting phase.
Verbal restructuring elicited the facts that his friends had both become drug addicts, and
had fairly disastrous relationships with others, whilst he still had good relationships with
other friends and his family, and had a nice partner and a baby.
In the imaginal rescripting he intervened in the party scene, telling his friend to back off
and leave his younger self alone. When he relived the memory again as his younger self
(with the adult self intervening) he was asked if there was anything else he needed to make
him feel better. He chose to introduce his second ‘‘friend’’ into the situation, and then
bring in other friends and members of his own family and the families of his two friends.
When he had done this he went on to imagine himself confronting the two bullies. He1Details of cases have been slightly changed to ensure anonymity.
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family and friends lined up to back him, rather than his old ‘‘friends.’’ This was because
these young men had become losers and upset a lot of people, whilst John had quietly got
on with his own life.
John felt calmer and happier once he could view the situation in this way. Also he felt
that the new image reﬂected current reality, whilst the old one really was a ghost from the
past.
Sarah was a 30 year old woman who had a recurrent image in social situations of
looking blank and odd with a mouth that moved with no words coming out. This image
developed when she was 23 years old after an experience at work that was also linked to
the onset of her social phobia. Sarah worked for a media company then. Her new manager,
Stacy, called her into her ofﬁce and asked, ‘‘Tell me what you’ve been working on over the
last few months.’’ Sarah’s mind went blank and a wave of fear passed through her. She
could not think of what to say and this made her feel more and more anxious. She felt as
though ten minutes of silence passed before she could speak at which point, she said ‘‘I’m
sorry, I need to go to the toilet.’’ Sarah felt embarrassed and ashamed. She thought all her
colleagues knew that she had rushed out of her meeting with Stacy because she was so
nervous. She thought they all believed she was weird. As a result of the event, Sarah took
two weeks off work and then left her job permanently. Sarah believed the event and now
her image meant that she was an anxious and weird person, that people would see this and
reject her.
The cognitive restructuring phase helped Sarah to look at the event in alternative ways.
Her work at the media company had been during a stressful time in her life. Through
guided discovery, Sarah concluded that what she perceived to be signs of being an anxious
person could also be signs of transient stress. Sarah was working long hours, her father had
just been hospitalised for early onset dementia, her boyfriend had split up with her and she
had had to move house. Looking at the evidence for and against the belief that she is weird
revealed that what she deﬁned as weird behaviour had nothing to do with her behaviour
with Stacy. Sarah thought that weird behaviour was talking nonsense like saying ‘‘pigs
wear ribbons,’’ laughing inappropriately, wearing strange clothing, walking funny and
behaving as if you are really drunk all the time. She realised she had done none of these
things with Stacy. In further questioning about her work, she also remembered that the
media company telephoned her 2 months after she had left and invited her to join a new
project they were working on. Sarah was asked how this request ﬁt with the belief that they
perceived she was weird and anxious and wanted to reject her. She said she had never
looked at the situation in this way before.
In the rescripting phase, Sarah relived the memory from the age at which it occurred.
She then relived it again as a 30 year old in the ofﬁce watching what happened to her 23
year old self. She said the 23 year old in her memory looked stressed and in need of
reassurance rather than criticism. She noticed that in fact it did not look at all like 10
minutes had passed before she could speak, but rather seconds. She intervened at this stage
and reassured the 23 year old. She spoke to her about all her worries about looking
anxious, and summarised what she had learned in the cognitive restructuring phase about
signs of stress. She also pointed out that her new manager did not reject her. In fact, the
media company asked her to stay on for another job. She pointed out that she has lots of
friends now and people do not reject her. She also looked around at other people in her
ofﬁce and she said she could see them getting on with their work, not at all aware of Sarah
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even now 7 years on, is still not rejected. In the ﬁnal phase of the rescripting, Sarah relived
the event from the 23 year old perspective with her 30 year old self in the room. This time
23 year old Sarah had a chat with her new manager. She explained that she felt overworked
and that she was also having a hard time at home. She asked for feedback. In the feedback,
her new manager said that she had received very good reports about Sarah’s work and that
they would like to keep her on for another project.
After rescripting, Sarah said that she realised she had been the one who had created
the negative image of herself. She said she could see other people did not reject her then
or now and that her behaviour had not been weird but rather, understandable given the
circumstances.4. Development series
Next we describe the results obtained in a series of patients who received memory
rescripting while we were developing the procedure.4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Our sample consisted of 14 patients (ﬁve female) who were receiving or about to receive
cognitive therapy for social phobia. Twelve were attending the Centre for Anxiety
Disorders and Trauma in London and had received four sessions of treatment. Two
had attended the University Psychiatry Department at the Warneford Hospital in Oxford
for assessment and had not yet started treatment. They all met the criteria for social phobia
on the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM IV (SCID; First, Gibbon, Williams, &
Spitzer, 1995) and the social phobia module of the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule
(ADIS; Brown, Di Nardo, & Barlow, 1994). Patients had a mean score of 84.42
(SD ¼ 17.99) on the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Baker, Heinrichs, Kim, and
Hoffman, 2002), a mean score of 26 (SD ¼ 3.33) on the Fear of Negative Evaluation
Questionnaire (FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969), and a mean score of 10.64 (SD ¼ 7.18) on
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). Patients had a
mean age of 28.64 years (SD ¼ 3.75) with a mean age of onset of social phobia of 16.07
years (SD ¼ 7.64). The mean age at which the memory occurred was 15.18 years
(SD ¼ 6.99).4.2. Measures
4.2.1. Imagery and memory ratings: distress and vividness
Participants were asked to call their negative image to mind and to dwell on it. They
were then asked how distressing the image was on a scale of 0 ‘‘not at all’’ to 100
‘‘extremely.’’ They were also asked how vivid it was on the same scale. Next they were
asked to call to mind their associated memory and to dwell on it. They were asked how
distressing and vivid it was on the same scale. Three patients did not complete the image
and memory vividness ratings.
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Participants were asked to rate on a scale of 0 ‘‘not at all’’ to 100 ‘‘extremely’’ how
strongly they believed their encapsulated belief, the statement that captured the meaning of
their image and memory.
Participants completed two measures of social anxiety.4.2.3. Social phobia weekly summary scale (SPWSS; Clark et al., 2006)
This six item scale comprises 0–8 ratings of social anxiety, avoidance, self-focused versus
externally focused attention, anticipatory processing and postevent rumination.4.2.4. Social cognitions questionnaire (SCQ; A. Wells, L. Stopa, & D.M. Clark,
unpublished)
This 22-item questionnaire asks patients to rate how frequently they have had common
social phobia cognitions (e.g., ‘‘I will be unable to speak,’’ ‘‘I will sweat/perspire,’’ ‘‘I am
foolish’’) in the previous week and how much they believed them to be true when they felt
anxious. The questionnaire yields two total scores: frequency (of thoughts) and belief (how
much they believed the thoughts to be true when they occurred). The total frequency score
ranges from 22 to 110 and the total belief score ranges from 0 to 2200. The mean SCQ
frequency and belief scores for patients with social phobia at pretreatment in a recent
treatment trial (Mortberg, Clark, Sundin, & Wistedt, 2007) were 60 and 950, respectively.4.2.5. Procedure
Prior to the session, participants completed the SPWSS and the SCQ. The semi-
structured interview was then administered. Following this, participants rated how much
they believed their encapsulated belief. They also completed imagery and memory ratings.
At the end of the memory rescripting, belief ratings and ratings of the vividness and
distress of the image and memory were taken again. One week later, participants
completed the SPWSS and the SCQ as well as the encapsulated belief, imagery and
memory ratings. One of two clinical psychologists, with extensive training in cognitive
therapy and imagery rescripting, carried out the procedures with patients.4.3. Results
4.3.1. Within session
Paired samples t-tests were performed to compare the difference between the pre- and
post-rescripting scores on the following measures: (1) encapsulated belief (2) image distress
(3) memory distress (4) image vividness and (5) memory vividness. Effect sizes (d) were also
calculated to determine the magnitude of effect. Cohen (1988) proposed a threefold
classiﬁcation system of effect sizes: small (.20–.49), medium (.50–.79), and large (.80 and
above). Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the pre- and post-rescripting
scores, the t values, signiﬁcance levels and magnitude of effects. Patients rated the strength
of their encapsulated belief as signiﬁcantly weaker after rescripting compared to before
rescripting. They also rated their image and memory as signiﬁcantly less distressing and
less vivid after rescripting compared to before rescripting. All effect sizes were large.
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Means and standard deviations at pre-rescripting and post-rescripting on measures of encapsulated belief,
imagery and memory for the total sample
Measure Total sample (N ¼ 14) Analysis
Pre-rescripting Post-rescripting Paired samples t-test Effect size
Mean SD Mean SD t df p d
Encapsulated belief 75.71 23.73 22.14 18.90 7.54 13 .001 2.51
Image distress 54.29 24.08 20.71 22.69 4.97 13 .001 1.44
Memory distress 66.07 22.03 23.57 25.53 4.93 13 .001 1.79
Image vividness 60.91 27.73 32.27 25.82 3.32 10 .008 1.07
Memory vividness 68.64 24.09 45.45 30.78 2.92 10 .015 .86
Table 2
Means and standard deviations at pre-rescripting and 1 week post-rescripting on social anxiety, image and
memory measures
Measure Follow-up sample (n ¼ 8) Analysis
Pre-rescripting One week post-
rescripting
Paired samples t-test Effect
size
Mean SD Mean SD t df p d
Social phobia weekly
summary scale
5.02 1.16 4.02 1.46 2.61 7 .035 0.76
Social cognitions frequency 58.38 11.87 47.50 9.29 3.61 7 .009 1.03
Social cognitions total belief
score
815.63 320.04 605.63 275.26 2.83 7 .025 0.71
Encapsulated belief 74.88 27.55 33.38 28.11 3.31 7 .013 1.49
Image distress 55.00 28.28 27.50 26.59 2.02 7 .083 1.00
Memory distress 74.38 21.62 3.75 7.44 8.67 7 .001 4.86
Image vividness 65.00 32.09 35.00 23.45 1.94 5 .111 1.08
Memory vividness 82.50 19.93 30.00 31.62 5.18 5 .004 2.04
J. Wild et al. / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 38 (2007) 386–401 3954.3.2. Measures taken 1 week later
Six patients attended a cognitive therapy session before the 1 week follow-up time point
and so were excluded from further analyses, leaving eight patients in the follow-up sample.
Paired samples t-tests were performed to compare the difference between their pre-
rescripting scores and 1 week follow-up scores on the social phobia measures (SPWSS and
SCQ) and the image and memory measures (encapsulated belief, and image and memory
distress and vividness). Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations at the two time
points, the t values, signiﬁcance levels and magnitude of effects. On average, patients had
signiﬁcantly lower scores on the SPWSS 1 week after rescripting compared to before
rescripting. They also scored signiﬁcantly lower on the frequency and belief scales of the
SCQ 1 week after rescripting compared to before rescripting. Patients appeared to
ARTICLE IN PRESS
J. Wild et al. / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 38 (2007) 386–401396maintain most of their within-session change 1 week later. They rated their encapsulated
belief as signiﬁcantly weaker and their memory as signiﬁcantly less distressing and less
vivid one week after rescripting compared to before rescripting. There was a trend (po.08)
for patients to feel less distressed about their recurrent image 1 week after rescripting
compared to before rescripting. They also rated their image as less vivid. However, this was
not signiﬁcant (p ¼ .111). All effect sizes were medium or large.
5. Discussion
This study describes our method of rescripting early memories linked to recurrent
negative imagery in patients with social phobia. Further, we looked at the effect of this
procedure on the distress, vividness and meaning of patients’ early memories linked to
their current negative imagery. We also looked at the effect on social cognitions and other
symptoms of social phobia. One session of memory rescripting signiﬁcantly reduced the
distress and vividness of patients’ traumatic social memories as well as their meaning
within session and 1 week later. Further, the procedure led to a signiﬁcant within session
reduction in the distress and vividness of patients’ negative images. One week later, there
was a trend for patients to rate their images as less distressing, but not less vivid. Finally,
on a measure of social cognitions (the SCQ), patients reported having signiﬁcantly fewer
negative social concerns in the previous week (e.g., ‘‘I am weird/different;’’ ‘‘people will
stare at me’’) and reported believing them much less strongly. They also showed signiﬁcant
improvement on the SPWSS, which measures the severity of components of social phobia
such as, anxious affect, avoidance, self-focused attention, and anticipatory and postevent
processing.
As expected, our sample of patients reported high levels of vividness and distress in
relation to their images and memories. This is interesting because vividness has been a
cornerstone variable in studies of mental imagery. Yet little is known about its relationship
to valence. Experimental studies in non-clinical populations indicate that these variables
may be related. For example, Bywaters, Andrade, and Turpin (2004) demonstrated that
images of pictures rated as extremely valenced (positively or negatively) were also rated as
being more vivid. Several studies in clinical populations suggest high levels of vividness and
distress for images associated with current concerns. Pratt, Cooper, and Hackmann (2004)
showed that spontaneous and self-generated spider images in people with high spider
anxiety were rated as more vivid and distressing than those of participants with low spider
anxiety, whilst butterﬂy images in the two groups did not differ. Studies of body
dysmorphic disorder (Osman, Cooper, & Hackmann, 2004) and bulimia nervosa
(Somerville, Cooper, & Hackmann, this issue) indicated that whilst images of the self in
these disorders were not more frequent than in control groups they were more vivid and
distressing. Finally, Hunt et al. (2006) report that blind observer ratings of horror and
distress associated with the content of phobic imagery were strongly correlated with
participants’ own ratings of the vividness of these same images.
In this study, vividness and distress of both images and memories fell following the
intervention. In two studies of intrusive images of memories in PTSD, ratings of vividness,
distress, frequency and sense of ‘‘nowness’’ fell steadily in synchrony over several weeks.
This followed the start of reliving, restructuring and rescripting of the traumatic memories
during treatment. There had been no changes in these variables during the period of
assessment (Hackmann et al., 2004; Speckens, Hackmann, Ehlers, & Clark, 2006). The
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have been further and possibly more stable improvements in the present study on social
phobia, had there been more sessions devoted to work on the disturbing memories.
This preliminary, uncontrolled study, like the results of a subsequent controlled study
reported elsewhere (Wild et al., in press), supports the view that as well as attending to
current symptoms of social phobia it may be worthwhile to look at the possible origins of
the problem, and to target key memories that carry toxic meanings for the patient, as they
appear to provide input to recurrent images of the self in this disorder. This could be
important as the images themselves have been shown to trigger anxiety and safety
behaviours, and may thus play a role in maintenance (e.g., Hirsch et al., 2004).
The efﬁcacy of imagery rescripting in this study is consistent with a growing body of
research that has used the procedure in cognitive-behavioural treatments for different
disorders, including bulimia nervosa (i.e., Cooper et al., 2007; Ohanian, 2001), borderline
personality disorder (i.e., Giesen-Bloo et al., 2006), and PTSD (e.g., Smucker & Neiderdee,
1995). Rescripting the identiﬁed social phobia related traumatic memories in this study led
to dramatic reductions in patients’ beliefs associated with the memories and images, as well
as in social phobia cognitions and other symptoms.
There are several aspects of our intervention that may have been helpful. The proce-
dure described here incorporates components of reliving, verbal restructuring and
rescripting of the event in imagery. These elements are also components of the protocol
for a recently reported effective treatment for PTSD (Ehlers et al., 2005). Imaginal
rescripting has also been utilised in isolation, in cases of PTSD where patients had not
responded to prolonged exposure (Grunert et al., 2003). Of particular interest are the
results of studies like that carried out by Arntz et al. (this issue), which compared ima-
ginal exposure with and without rescripting of memories, and furnishes us with a glimpse
of ways in which the effectiveness of various components of the treatment may be
examined.
In our study the procedure included asking the patient to vividly evoke the memory
three times in total, describing it from various perspectives in the present tense. This
repetition is similar to reliving in various CBT programs for PTSD, in which patients are
asked to repeatedly go through the traumatic memory. It has been suggested that reliving
is effective in PTSD because it allows for reﬂection and spontaneous cognitive change, as
well as habituation (Hackmann, 2005). Foa and Rothbaum (1998) have also observed that
reliving allows the patient to come to the possible conclusion that the original negative
evaluations were not consistent with all the available evidence. Thus, the reliving aspect of
our intervention may have helped patients to come to new conclusions about the earlier
event and its current implications.
The verbal restructuring component deliberately prompted patients to consider evidence
for and against the meaning of their early memory and image. This helped them to
reevaluate how they perceived the event at the time (e.g., were they generally perceived as
inferior or unlikable or did it just feel that way?), and how accurate the meaning was in the
present (e.g., how do other people actually view them now?). Some patients realised that
they were never really worthy of rejection, it just felt like that. Others appreciated that they
were rejected in the past, but that this was no longer the case: the meaning of the memory
was out of date. In addition, verbal restructuring helped patients to take a less personal
view of the event, to see it as meaning (for example) something about the bullies, rather
than about themselves.
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involved imagining entering the scene as an empowered adult who could take effective
action, and then subsequently experiencing compassion and nurturance as the younger
person. Evoking this vivid imagery from new perspectives is likely to have been another
important ingredient in the intervention. Patients may have seen more clearly and felt more
strongly that their younger selves were acceptable and deserving of comfort rather than
criticism, and that the event had implications about others (e.g., the bullies or critical
adults) rather than themselves. Further, some may also have interpreted other people’s
intentions as more benign than they had previously thought. Hackmann (2005) suggests
that experiencing empowerment and compassion in imagery helps patients to reevaluate
themselves and the behaviour of others, which can soften the sense of threat.
Overall the process of reviewing and rescripting the traumatic memory reduced the
severity of social phobia as reﬂected in the mean item rating of the SPWSS and also the
total belief and frequency scores on the SCQ. It is possible that the procedure led patients
to update the meaning of the earlier event and to no longer see it as something toxic with
future implications. This may have led them to reevaluate other social concerns which may
account for why they had fewer in the week following rescripting and why they believed
them less strongly. The SPWSS measures patients’ perceived severity of social anxiety in
the previous week as well as their avoidance, self-focused attention, and anticipatory and
postevent processing. Regarding change on this measure, it is possible that having learned
to see the event differently and to master the event in imagery (in that they intervened, and
then soothed the younger self) may have encouraged patients to engage in more social
situations, and to do so differently: attending to them more fully once in them, as well as
worrying about them less before and afterwards. This study did not look at the direct
impact of rescripting on speciﬁc processes (e.g., self-focused attention, avoidance, pre- and
postevent processing), or the effects on mood, and future research could do this to
determine how rescripting mediates change in social phobia symptoms.
This study is a small, exploratory study with several limitations. Firstly, there was no
control session. Thus, it is unclear whether imagery rescripting led to change or whether
discussion of the early memory without rescripting would have led to change by itself.
However, in their recent study, Wild et al. (in press), found that compared to a control
session (involving discussion of the memories), imagery rescripting led to signiﬁcantly
greater change in the distress and vividness of patients’ images and memories as well as
symptoms of social phobia, both within session and one week later. These results were
similar to those in a study of rescripting in bulimia nervosa (Cooper et al., 2007).
Secondly, the sample size is small, particularly after 1 week, in this naturalistic,
exploratory study. However, despite this, rescripting did lead to signiﬁcant within session
change, and much signiﬁcant change when tested after 1 week, which is encouraging, and
may stimulate others to do more ambitious studies. Thirdly the intervention was brief, and
it might be interesting to try a longer intervention and examine the stability of the results
over a longer period of time, as in the study of depressed patients with intrusive memories
(Wheatley et al., this issue).
The design of our study does not allow for analysis of the three separate components of
our procedure, i.e., reliving, verbal restructuring and imagery rescripting. Thus, it is not
possible to conclude which component is the most important or effective. Future studies
could compare these components separately and in combination. For example, does the
largest shift come from evoking the memory as in the reliving component? Or, is it
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effectively? Does verbal restructuring enhance the chance of providing the patient with an
alternative and less toxic view of the past? Or, is it sufﬁcient to just prompt for change in
the memory image, by asking the patient to view it from another perspective? One could
also examine whether interventions that bring about belief change are necessary for
symptom reduction, or whether creating other kinds of competing images that contain
some of the old elements, but with new features and positive affect might be sufﬁcient to
decrease symptomatology (Brewin, 2006).
Finally, one could explore whether identifying and transforming memories that the
patient sees as supporting negative beliefs could enhance collaboration and response to
other aspects of treatment. Imagery rescripting provides a powerful emotional experience
for patients, enhancing compassion for the younger self and reducing the sense of
helplessness. It often seems to bring about greater willingness to experiment with dropping
safety behaviours and reducing avoidance, as the patient has made the meta-cognitive shift
towards seeing the distressing self image as being the product of their own mind, rather
than mirroring reality. As one patient most eloquently expressed this shift:It is as if I have been looking at myself in a mirror for years, and it is only now that I
see that it was the mirror that was ﬂawed and not me.Acknowledgement
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